Examples Of Interpretive Disagreements

Examples Of Interpretive Disagreements

It is assumed that any serious or actual theoretical disagreement is a reasonable philosophical disagreement over what is considered law or on the methods of interpretation that are acceptable and most appropriate, both in general and in certain institutional circumstances. The question is what makes the different traditional positivist and non-positivist positions acceptable in the discourse. Our answer is that different theories can only have a legitimate position in theoretical differences of opinion if they deal with the same evidence or the same evidence using common scientific methodological standards. Footnote 14 It is a fact that there is an equality of evidence and oversight between traditional law positivists and non-positivists and that it is recognized by both parties as epistemic Peers. In the dispute between positivists and non-positivists, there is only partial agreement on several sources of law. Positivists accept social sources as sufficient evidence; The Dworkineans feel that they are insufficient. In addition, positivists believe that additional theoretical evidence relied upon by their opponents is inappropriate. However, this does not prevent all parties from getting involved in a reasonable debate. 55Drivement, in terms of interpretation, we cannot avoid the problem by saying that there is convergence in the sources.

A degree of agreement is required for the law to fulfil its function as a driving guide and make the recognition rule useful. These differences are also marginal and, if they were important, we doubt that it is a legal system. In any case, the recognition of the existence of interpretive instruments does not mean that everything is controversial: there is a broad consensus on the number of cases to be resolved.43 It is only recently that positivists have agreed that the phenomenon of theoretical divergences represents a serious challenge for the traditional positivist image [11, 17, 18, 51,52.53]. Dworkin`s assertion that theoretical differences are the most important feature of legal practice is the result of his holistic and pragmatic approach [9:160]. The central role of these differences is also related to their philosophical and practical dimension. Footnote 9 However, Dworkinean`s approach to differences of opinion is somewhat paradoxical, for the mere existence of such differences, which for him are genuine differences of opinion, may indicate that the law knows no limits or, at the very least, that the limits of the law are as far apart as the scope of those differences.


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